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Abstract: This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Armstrong and Charles 
Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of universals' is not a problem in pure 
ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it to be. Rather, it 
extends to issues concerning which predicates should be applied where, issues which 
Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which from a Peircean perspective 
encompass even the fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peir ce's 
scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing the existent 
front the real) but also provides more of a sense of why realism should be a position worth 
fighting for. 
... a realist is simply one who knows no more recondite  reality than 
that which is represented in a true representation. 
C.S. Peirce 
Like many other philosophical problems, the grandly-named 'Problem of 
Universals' is difficult to define without begging the question that it 
raises.  Laurence Goldstein, however,  provides a helpful hands -off 
denotation of the problem by noting that it proceeds from what he calls 
The Trivial Obseruation:2 The observation is the seemingly incontrovertible 
claim that, 'sometimes some things have something in common'. The 
1 Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buehler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), 
248. 
2 Laurence Goldstein, 'Scientific Scotism – The Emperor's New Trousers or Has Armstrong 
Made Some Real Strides?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol 61, No. 1 (March 1983), 40. 
See also the view W.V.O. Quine puts into the mouth of McX in 'On What There Is': ' ... he 
says: "There are .red houses, red roses and red sunsets; this much is prephilosophical 
common sense in which we must all agree. These houses, roses and sunsets, then, have 
something in common; and this which they have in common is all I mean by the attribute of 
redness."' W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1953), 9-10. 
problem of universals then concerns what exactly is this `something'. 
Consider a large group of cats gathered together. These attractive, 
sensitive and wilful creatures will be found to share certain features, suc h 
as similarities in appearance and behaviour, which cats do not share with 
other animals (such as pigs). Because of this, our ordinary language 
licenses the statement, 'all cats have something in common'. But what is 
this 'something', and how do we manage to attribute it to cats and to no 
other creatures? 
The main issue with respect to our `something' is: whether the something 
may be called real. Of course, how this question is answered will depend on 
just what is meant by the crucial term, Teal '. Contempo rary analytic 
metaphysics almost universally takes for granted that the terms `real' and 
`exis tent '  a re  coextensive .  I  sha l l  argue  tha t  they are  no t .  Much 
contemporary analytic metaphysics also takes for granted that there is a 
sharp distinction between `semantic' and 'ontological' questions, and that 
realism is a question located purely within ontology (construed as the 
question of what exists). I shall suggest that this has distorted discussion 
of the problem of universals in favour of nominalism. 
It will turn out that the history of the treatment of the problem of 
universals, and of the treatment of the term `real' since the thirteenth 
century are intertwined. It is well known that the debate over universals 
first came to ful l f lower amongst the scholastic philosophers,  with 
Ockham the most famous combatant on the nominalist side, arguing 
against the subtle 'scholastic realism' of Duns Scotus a generation earlier. 
As scholasticism gave way to new, vigorous strains of philosophy in the 
Early Modern period it was widely assumed that nominalism had won the 
debate over universals. The transmutation of Scotus' name into common 
parlance as the term `dunce' is a somewhat disturbing symbol of the 
extent to which scholastic realism became associated with all that was 
dess ica ted ,  use less  and inappropr ia te ly a  pr io r i  about  scho las t ic  
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philosophy. Today even scholastic realists will admit that scholastic 
realism struggles with an image-problem as counterintuitive.' 
I  sha l l  exp lo re  and  cont r a s t  t he  scho la s t ic  rea l i sm o f  David  
Armstrong, who works within the twentieth century analytic paradigm 
whereby 'real' and 'existent' are coextensive, and Charles Peirce , who saw 
the real as properly opposed not the the nonexistent but the fictive. I 
shall  examine a recent  skirmish in the contemporary debate over 
universals between Armstrong and Michael Devitt, and suggest that it 
exhibits a measure of the sterility which  medieval realism has been 
accused of, which renders it: unclear why we should care about the truth 
of scholastic realism. I shall then argue that if, however, one reexamines 
the issues discussed by Armstrong in the terms laid down by Peirce, 
scholastic realism is far from being on the back foot with respect to 
intuitive appeal, but becomes a claim about the objectivity of certain 
predications., rather than a claim about whether certain somewhat unusual 
entities exist. Although it should be noted that Armstrong's views are in 
some ways idiosyncratic (for instance in the degree of sharpness with 
which he delineates semantic and ontological issues) and should not be 
taken as representative of contemporary approaches to rea lism about 
universals, he is an early, and arguably the most prominent, defender of 
such realism in the analytic tradition, and his view is worth discussing for at 
least this reason. 
1. Armstrong: Scholastic Realism Australian-Style 
1.1. Particulars and Universals Exist, and only Together (in States of 
Affairs) 
Armstrong characterises the Realist-Nominalist debate as follows: 
3 Thus David Armstrong writes with respect to scholastic realism regarding laws of nature, '1 
believe that the contemporary orthodoxy on laws of nature – that basically they are mere 
regularities in the four-dimensional scenery – is in a similar position to that enjoyed by the 
regimes in power in Eastern Europe until a few months ago .. ', (His choice of analogy 
demonstrates recognition of the current repressed status of scholastic realism, tempered by a 
certain hopefu lness about the future).  D.M. Armstrong, 'Shoemaker's  Theory of  
Properties' (Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies). 
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Nominalism is defined as the doctrine that everything there is is a 
particular and nothing but a particular. A Realist is one who denies 
this proposition, holding that Universals exist.' 
What does Armstrong mean by the term 'Universal'? He writes: 
Universals are entities that are identical, strictly identical, in different 
instantiat ions,  and so are the foundations in  re  for  al l  genuine 
resemblances between particulars.' 
While Armstrong rejects Nominalism, he also wishes to separate his own 
'Immanent Realism' from 'Platonic' or 'Transcendent Realism', the view 
tha t  un iver sa l s  might  ex i s t  wi tho ut  be ing  ins tan t i a ted .  T ho ugh  
Armstrong i s  a  for thr ight  Reali st  about Universals,  this  does not  
downgrade his ontological  acceptance of par t iculars.  He sees the  
inclusion of both part iculars and Universals as vi tal for a healthy 
ontology.• 
It should be noted that in the twentieth century an idiosyncratic use of 
the term 'nominalism' has sprung up, deriving originally from Harvard. 
This usage sees nominalism as denying the reality not of general but of 
abstract objects, such as sets and propositions. The usage is somewhat. 
confusing as the original nominalism aimed to eliminate or reduce all 
but the logically particular, yet sets and propositions can in fac t be 
t r ea t ed  a s  lo g ica l  pa r t i cu la r s . '  T he  Harvard  usage ,  i n  ta rge t ing  
4 D.M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), Vol. I, 1. A capitalisation of the terms 'Realism' and 'Universal' (and not 
'particular') is Armstrong's preferred usage, so I will follow this usage when discussing his 
views. 
5 D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 21. 
6 It is worth noting that over the course of his philosophical career, Armstrong has moved to 
the view that one needs to commit not just to particulars and Universals but to states of 
affairs in which the two are combined in a structured way. However, this change in 
Armstrong's views is outside the scope of this paper. 
7 Sets are not treated as logical particulars by (the Harvard philosopher) Nelson Goodman, 
however, as he regards the notion of set as intensional, and this perhaps helped to facilitate 
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abstraction rather than generality for reduction, seems to run together 
nominalism with materialism, a posit ion which surely is worthy of 
separate discussion. Armstrong has deplored such uses of the terms 
'nominalism' and 'abstract', ' and thus, although the Harvard usage has 
become influential, this paper will keep to the original understanding of 
the problem of universals, and it should be noted that the distinction 
between Universals and particulars discussed here will be orthogonal to 
the abstract/concrete distinction (although the two distinctions do of 
course intersect in ways too complex for the present paper to embark on 
discussing). 
1.2. A Posteriori Realism 
It is fundamental to Armstrong's Realism about Universals that it is an a 
posteriori Realism. By this he means that there is no automatic correlation 
between predicates and Universals. Universals are not to be read blithely 
off the shape of our  language. '  Rather ,  Universals are discovered 
through the hard empirical work that constitutes science. Thus, there 
may be predicates in our language to which no Universal corresponds in 
the world. (Armstrong suggests 'accelerates through the speed of light' as a 
possible example here.) There also may be Universals to which none of 
our predicates correspond, or even to which none of our predicates ever 
will correspond due to our epistemological limitations. The latter is a 
hard proposition to establish empirically, but. Armstrong claims that 
Realism and the possibility of long-term human error about the world go 
hand in hand. 
Armstrong argues that when doing philosophy one must separate in 
principle semantic questions (questions of where and when to apply 
certain predicates) from ontological questions (questions of the existence 
the slide in meaning from medieval to Harvard nominalism. (Thanks to Josh Parsons for 
discussions on this point.) 
8 Armstrong A World of States of Affairs, pages 120 & 136. 
9 Armstrong calls this mistake, 'the Argument from Meaning', and also 'Rationalism' 
(which label he treats as already a serious philosophical blow against the view to which it is 
ascribed). 
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of various Universals). For as there is no automatic correlation between 
predicates and Universals, who is to say that discussion of either question 
will throw light on the other? For this reason my initial illustration of the 
problem of universals using t he example of `cathood' is somewhat 
misleading with respect to Armstrong, as Armstrong's Universals are 
much less  homely,  more  spa t io tempora l ly f ine -gra ined  and a lso 
correspond to much more theoretical predicates than this.' 'Is a cat' for 
him is precisely the sort of predicate which demonstrates the need to 
separate semantics from ontology. But we will see that Peirce does not 
share these qualms, 
1.3. The Explanatory Power of Universals 
In  1978 Armstrong set  out  a  landmark taxonomy ( intended  to  be  
exhaustive) of different varieties of Nominalism: Predicate Nominalism'', 
Concept Nominalism, Class Nominalism, Mereological Nominalism, 
Resemblance Nominalism, and (last and very much least in Armstrong's 
mind) Ostrich or Cloak and Dagger, Nominalism. Armstrong c laims that 
almost all Nominalisms view properties as some form of external relation 
between the thing that has the properties, and something else (such as 
class membership, being thought of in a certain way, being part of a 
mereological aggregate...). This is just not satisfying, as in all these cases 
we can imagine the thing not partaking in the external relation, but still 
having the property. 
Armstrong refutes Predicate Nominalism this way: 
According to Predicate Nominalism, an object's possession of (say) the 
property, being white, is completely determined by the fact that the 
predicate 'white' applies to this object. But now let us make a 
thought-experiment. Let us imagine that the predicate 'white' does not exist. 
10 An example of the kind of Universal he does consider likely to exist is the charge on an 
electron. See for instance, Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs , 26. 
11 Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. I, 11-44. 
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Is it not obvious that the object might still be white? If so, its whiteness is 
not constituted by the object's relation to the predicate `white'.'' 
Class and Mereological  Nominali sm receive a  similar  send -off."  
Armstrong claims that Resemblance Nominalism is 'by far the most 
satisfactory version of Nominalism'. But he notes that in claiming to 
explain properties in terms of 'resemblance relations' between things, it 
appears merely to substitute for the type -term 'property' something 
equally in need of Nominalistic explication. 
Even worse  than these  vers ions  o f  Nominal i sm,  accord ing to  
Armstrong,  i s  the  phi losophica l ly highly i r responsib le  'Ost r ich 
Nominalism', of which Quine is an example. Such a position (which 
claims that facts such as that 'Fluffy is a cat' is true while 'Fluffy is a pig' is 
false, are primitives which require no explanation) is unacceptable 
because: 
[w]hat such a Nominalist is doing is simply refusing to give any 
account of the type/token distinction, and, in particular, any account of 
types. But, like anybody else, such a Nominalist will make continual use 
of the dist inction.  He therefore owes us an account of the 
distinction. It is a compulsory question in the examination paper." 
In short, realism about Universals is required by Armstrong to explain 
the fact that when we state that things have properties we often speak 
truly, by claiming that those true statements refer to Universals as well as to 
particular things. A way of putting this argument which has become 
prominent in Armstrong's recent writing on Universals' is to claim that 
Universals must be present in truth-makers for true statements involving 
predicates of a general nature (which notion of 'truth-making' now plays a 
prominent role in Australian realism generally). 
12 Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. I, 17. 
13 Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. I, pages 37 and 35 respectively. 
14 Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. I, p. 17. 
15 See for instance Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, 2-3. 
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1.4. Devitt Defends Nominalism 
Michael  Devit t  agrees with Armstrong about the need to separate 
semantic and ontological questions.' He sets out to defend Nominalism 
against Armstrong's attacks and, with characteristic brashness, positions 
himself squarely in the Ostrich Nominalist camp: 
Ostriches are reputed to ignore problems by putting their heads  in 
the sand. Mirages are another feature of desert life: people see things 
that aren't there. An `Ostrich Nominalist' is a person who maintains 
Nominalism whilst, ignoring a problem. A 'Mirage Realist' is a person 
who adopts Realism because he sees a problem that. isn't there.' 
He claims that those who believe that there is a real problem which 
requires Realism about Universals as its solution have failed to appreciate 
the "'new" metaphysics of W.V. Quine and others'. According to Devitt's 
version of Quine, one's ontological commitment is gauged by working 
out 'what must exist for a given sentence to be true'. Thus, sentences 
such as, 'My two cats share a property: their species', seem to require the 
existence of the property of cathood. However, when we ar e in the 
business of tallying up ontological commitment,  sentences may be 
paraphrased in such a way that ontological commitment, is reduced, as 
long as meaning is preserved. Thus, 'My two cats share a property', in 
this context, may be paraphrased as 'My two cats are both cats', which 
commits only to two individuals, which happen both to possess a certain 
property. 
Devitt acknowledges that at this point Armstrong will protest, Tut in 
virtue of what do these two cats both instantiate this property? Surely it  is 
because they share something real?' Not at all, claims Devitt.: 
The  Quinean sees  no  prob lem for  No mina l i sm in  the  l i kes  o f  
[sentences of the form 'a is F'] because there is a well-known semantic 
16 A sustained working out of this separation is present ed in his Realism and Truth 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
17 Michael Devitt, '"Ostrich Nominalism" or "Mirage Realism"?', Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 61 (1980), 433. 
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theory which shows that ['a is F'] can be true without there being , any 
Universals: 
[ 'a  is  F ']  is true if  and only if  there exists an x such that 'a '  
designates x and 'F' applies to x.'8 
Thus, he argues that the only truth-makers our true sentences need are 
particular objects. 
Thus, the dialectic between Armstrong and Devitt takes the following 
form. Armstrong claims that  we need to postulate the existence of 
Universals that perform a truth-making role with respect to our true 
predicat ions ,  thereby explaining them.  Devit t  suggests  that  t rue  
predication is not in need of such explanation. A certain weariness 
descends on the debate at this point .  One is tempted to ask, what  
difference does it make here if Devitt is right or Armstrong is right? 
1.5. Predication and Substantive Disagreement 
I shall now argue that in fact Devitt and Armstrong are not engaged in a 
substantive disagreement. Consider the following principle (SD) as a 
necessary condition for substantive disagreement': 
(SD) (X 1....X„)  have a substantive disagreement if there is some 
predicate F to which (X,....X„) wish to give differing extensions. 
Thus, consider a sample disagreement,  say, over whether a certain 
animal, Fluffy, is a cat or a pig. Insofar as two people disagree over this 
question, they will wish to give a different extension to the predicate 'is a 
cat'. One person will wish to include Fluffy in the extension concerned, 
and the other will wish to exclude her. We can see, then, that in this case of 
straightforward substantive disagreement, the principle does provide a 
necessary condition for the disagreement in question. 
18 Devitt, p. 435. 
19 I suspect that it is also a sufficient condition, but it is not necessary for my purposes to 
argue this. 
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It might be objected that the principle's focus on predication leads it to 
ignore any features of the world which are not capturable by human 
language. Is the principle not antirealist, in that sense? However, the 
principle does not deny being to such features of the world, merely points 
out that, as it is not possible for us to refer to such features at all, it is not 
possible (alas) for us to substantively disagree over them. 
A second objection is that the principle 'might seem, again due to its 
emphasis on predication, to be biased towards general entities such as 
properties, at the expense of particular entities such as material objects. 
Can we not substantively disagree about the existence of particula r 
objects? However, at least since Quine we have learned that claims about. 
particular objects may be transformed into logically equivalent claims 
about the extension of predicates. So, for example, 'Pegasus exists' (a 
claim about which people may surely substantively disagree) may be 
transformed into , 'There is  something which Pegasizes ' .  Thus the 
distinction between the general and the particular is revealed to be, in 
the first instance, a matter of logic not of ontology. The existence of real 
generality will be found to have considerable flow-on effects for ontology, 
though not the simple connection whereby each real Universal provides 
the ontologist with a distinct existent entity imagined by Armstrong. (I 
w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  p o i n t  i n  s e c t i o n  2 . 5 . )  H a v i n g  p r o v i d e d  
counterarguments to the above two objections, I shall assume that SD 
does  in  fac t  p rovide  a  necessary condi t ion for  the  p resence  of  a  
substantive disagreement. 
In the disagreement between Devitt and Armstrong, both sides take 
the extension of any predicate as a given, and are merely quarreling 
about the metaphysical apparatus behind it. So, for instance, there is not. a 
single cat which ceases to be called a cat, or gains or loses a (first -order) 
property if one swaps one's metaphysical allegiance from Armstrong to 
Devitt, or vice versa. In other words, the only predicate whose extension 
Armstrong and Devitt are disputing is the technical, metaphysical, 
predicate, 'is a Universal'. The dispute concerns whether the extension of 
this predicate includes an enormous number of 'second-order objects', as 
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Armstrong would have us believe, or is empty, as Devitt would have us 
believe. Isn't this issue, then, a prime example of what Wittgenstein 
ca l led,  'a  wheel  which i s  no t  connected to  any o ther  par t  o f  the 
mechanism'? Isn't the nominalist justified in asking what is the point of 
introducing a predicate into one's ontology Cis a Universal') in order to 
star t a dispute which conc erns the extension of the new predicate 
alone?'" 
It is precisely the principled separation of semantic from ontological 
questions, which Devitt and Armstrong both subscribe to, which allows 
their disagreement to be so completely sealed off from differences  in 
predication (except in a degenerate sense with respect to the technical 
predicate 'is a Universal ') and thus from any substantive character.  
Rather, it is thought that Universals' only role is to 'truth-make' truths on 
which realists and nominalists agree. The term `truthmaker' is relatively 
new in philosophy, but the idea and a certain nominalist assault on it are 
as old as metaphysics itself. Berkeley's attack on Locke's 'material objects' 
(which lie behind all our ideas and both cause and resemble those ideas, to 
which Berkeley responded that they lay so irrevocably 'behind' our ideas 
that they formed an idle hypothesis) may be usefully viewed in this light, as 
may Putnam's attack in Reason, Truth and History on the putative, omnipresent 
'reference relation R' in contemporary 'metaphysical realism'. It. is an 
ironic feature of truthmaker accounts that it is the very (metaphysical) purity 
of their realism which invites the application of Ockham's nominalistic 
razor in this way. 
Therefore it appears that if there is to be a substantive disagreement 
over whether universals are real, realism must have a great deal to do 
with predication. Just what the involvement between realism and 
20 Compare the dispute over whether Fluffy should be included in the predicate 'is a cat', 
answers to which have a number of flow-on effects with respect to further predicates such as 
'has a tail' and 'will maiow'. One might protest that Armstrong and Devitt also disagree 
about the nature of natural laws (with Armstrong holding that they are relations among 
universals, which Devitt cannot) and their quarrel is substantive for that reason. However, 
again, note that the two do not disagree over whether a single natural law holds, only about 
what truth-makes whichever laws in fact hold. 
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predication might be will be the subject of the second section of this 
paper. 
2. Peirce: Scotistic Pragmati(ci)sm 
2.1. Where Peirce and Armstrong Agree. 
Like Armstrong, Peirce thought that taking a Realist stance was an 
important philosophical choice with deep consequences. He claimed that. 
his particular brand of realism was indebted to the scholastic realists, in 
particular to Scotus. Peirce also favoured an a posteriori scholastic realism, in 
that he thought the question of which universals to ascribe reality to 
should be an a posteriori matter. For he like Armstrong believed that the 
true importance of realism lay in explaining our scientific practice. 'I 
Thus, there is a Peircean analogue of Armstrong's claim that we must 
separate semantics from ontology and obtain knowledge of Universals 
through scientific work rather than linguistic analysis. Peirce makes a 
distinction between objective (which he called 'real') and subjective (which 
he called 'fictive') generality.
22
 Human beings use numerous predicates, 
which we can extend in countless ways to cover entities not previously 
described. 'To distinguish between objective and subjective generality is to 
say that some of these extensions latch onto, are somehow licensed by, a 
reality independent of ourselves. As such they are real discoveries, as 
opposed to a choice (either private or community-wide) which, by its 
nature as a choice, could have gone otherwise. 
21 He also thought that realism itself should be held to a posteriori: 'For the simpler 
hypothesis which excluded the influence of ideas upon matter had to be tried and 
persevered in until it was thoroughly exploded. But ... henceforward it will be a grave error of 
scientific philosophy to overlook the universal presence in the phenomenon of this ... 
category'. C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1933, 
1935, 1958), 5.64. 
22 Peirce did not like this use of the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' as opposites, 
preferring a medieval construal of the term 'objective' according to which it meant 
something more like 'intentional'. However, since the distinction has now become 
terminological orthodoxy I am using it to make his ideas clear. 
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However, Peirce's approach to the Problem of Universals is different 
from Armstrong's .  The differences take some teasing out,  but are 
profound. 
2.2. 'Universals' vs. 'Generals' 
Much of philosophical significance is packed into the fact that Peirce's 
stated commitment is to 'real generals' rather than 'existent Universals'. 
First of all, the term 'general' is fundamentally a logical rather than an 
onto logica l  no t ion.  I t  should  be  no ted,  however ,  tha t  logic was  
understood by Peirce not in the largely formalistic sense in which that 
subject is understood today, but as the study of maximising the truth of 
o u r  b e l i e f s . "  F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  mu c h  o f  wh a t  i s  n o w k n o wn  a s  
epistemology, semantics and scientific methodology, was included by 
Peirce under the heading of logic as a matter of course. 
The key to identifying Peircean generals is that the term includes 
anything projectible in the way that predicates are.' What is meant by this? 
Consider the later Wittgenstein's rule-following argument. Wittgenstein 
argued that no amount of enumeration of a rule's particular applications 
can exhaust the rule. Despite that (somehow, mysteriously) we 'know how 
to go on'.  Consider the rule for addition, wh ich we all follow with 
minimal trouble. The rule is arguably mind-independent, in that we can 
(and do) get the answer wrong. However, explaining in what way such a 
rule  might  cor respond  to  something tha t  exis ts  i s  a  no tor iously 
intractable problem. (Stating, for example, that the rule corresponds to 
an existent, mind-independent addition function seems merely to dodge 
the rule-following problem, not solve it.) 
23 More exactly, Peirce divided logic into three main branches: i) 'pure' or 'speculative' 
grammar, which studies the necessary preconditions of our signs having meaning, ii) 'logic 
proper', which studies 'the conditions of the truth of representations', and is pretty close to 
today's formal logic, and iii) 'pure' or 'speculative' rhetoric, which is c lose to what would be 
today be called scientific methodology. See, for instance, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, p. 
99. 
24 'The old definition of a general is Generale est quod natum aptum est dici de multi's. This 
recognises that the general is essentially predicative ... ' Peirce, Collected Papers , 5.102. 
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Where Armstrong's Universals are explicitly n-adic properties, and he is 
then faced with the problem of how to construct scientific laws out of 
complex, second-order relations between them, the Peircean 'general' is a 
blanket term which covers properties, laws of nature, patterns, habits, 
thoughts and more,  insofar  as they are projectible  in the way that  
p red icates  a re.  I t  might  seem infe l ic i tous  to  put  ent i t ies such as 
properties, on the one hand, and thoughts, on the other, together in the 
one  phi losophical  ca tegory.  For  are not  proper t ies object ive and  
`external' whereas thoughts are subjective and 'internal'? For Peirce, 
however, the line between subjective and objective does not fall along the 
(Cartesian) mind/world lines invoked by the use of the terms 'internal' 
and 'external' above. Thought-like entities can partake of objectivity just 
as much as things can, for Peirce, as we shall see.'. 
2.3 'Real' vs. 'Fictional' 
For his defini tion of 'real ',  Peirce returns to the term's source: the 
thirteenth century. There, he claims, the real was defined against the 
fictive—that which has whatever properties we choose to ascribe to it: 
Realism and realitas are not ancient words. They were invented to be 
terms of philosophy in the thirteenth century, and the meaning they 
were intended to express is perfectly clear. That is real which has such 
and  such charac ters ,  whether  anybody thinks  i t  to  have these 
characters or not (5.430).' 
Thus Peirce identifies the real with the mind-independent, where 
'mind-independent' is defined as what we can be wrong about. 
25 It might also seem infelicitous to put properties and laws of nature together in the one 
philosophical category, for arguably the two are very different. However, the two share 
'projectibility', for to understand 'white' and to understand the law of gravity is equally to 
grasp future instantiations of the property and of the law. He also treats the  difference 
between properties and laws of nature as a difference of degree rather than kind, but this 
matter is outside the scope of this paper. 
26 Following convention in Peirce scholarship, all numbered citations in the text are to 
volume and paragraph of the Collected Papers. 
130 Catherine Legg 
A possible objection is that this definition of the real is flawed because it 
renders unreal certain mental states which we want to count as real. For 
surely my beliefs, for example, are not independent of how I think about 
them? And are not my beliefs real?
27
 This objection, however, only has 
force against a Cartesian view of beliefs whereby beliefs have no 
substance apart from explicit representation to the mind's eye. Yet this is 
implausible. Consider my belief that tigers are dangerous. Is it the case 
that I can change this belief merely by thinking about it? And if a roaring 
tiger comes into view will I really not run away? Genuine beliefs are tied to, 
if not exhausted by, a vast network of dispositions to behave in certain ways, 
and it is implausible that we may selectively abandon swathes of these 
behavioural dispositions by mere doxastic fiat. This is leaving aside the 
enormously popular physicalist view tha t as well as a complicated 
functional role in our negotiating the world, much of which is not under 
our control, beliefs also possess a physiological manifestation (such as in 
states of the brain), the laws governing which may be studied like any 
other real scientific phenomenon, which is a further argument against 
the Cartesian position. 
`What then of qualia,?' the critic will ask. Surely there must be some 
mental events which are so private or so recondite that they are exactly as 
we think they are? Is not my very own taste of pineapple real? Yet isn't 
that taste exactly as I think it is? Can't I decide to have a thought the 
nature of which is entirely up to me? Here the Peircean will bite the 
bullet, arguing that if this taste of pineapple is really so epistemologically 
inaccessible that no-one can disagree with me about it (which seems 
strange as people do successfully discuss tastes with each other), what is 
lost by denying it reality? And this putative thought is a strange entity if I 
truly am free to dictate its character by the way I think of it. What is the 
thought 'about'? In this way Peirce's definition of the real resonates not 
only with Wittgenstein's account of rule -following, but also with his 
private language argument, and insistence that if 'whatever is going to 
27 Thanks are due to Daniel Nolan and Greg Restall for discussions on this point. 
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seem right to me is right', 'that only means that here we can't talk about 
"right—.28 
For a more straight forward example of the fict ive, consider the 
predicate 'humorous '  as applied to,  say,  a  hat .  There is  no fur ther  
criterion for whether a given hat is humorous than that a certain group 
of people find it so. We can give no sense to the idea that everyone wh o 
ever  came in  co ntac t  wi th  a  given ha t  might  b e  wro ng abo ut  i t s  
humorousness. Thus, the putative property of 'humorousness' is fictive.' 
(A signal of the potential confusion that lies  this area, however, is that 
the property, believed by the human race to be humorous' is, on the 
other hand, real). 
2.4. 'Real' vs. 'Existent' 
There is nothing in Peirce's definition of the real that renders it analytic 
that the real must be coextensive with the existent. How one should define 
the existent is not uncontroversi al.  I t  appears to be something of a  
family-resemblance concept whose 'features' include spatio -temporal 
location, causal efficacy, complete determinacy and material substance. 
However, in this paper I do not wish to take a stand on exactly how 
existence should be defined, merely to argue more broadly that the real 
and the existent should be distinguished. 
For example, someone who thought that numbers did not exist (due to 
their lack of spatio-temporal location and material substance) could quite 
well hold that they are real generals in Peirce's sense. For if by some 
bizarre mischance the entire mathematical community were to believe 
28 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trs. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford : Basil 
Blackwell, 1968), §258, p. 92. The congruence is not entirely coincidental as Wittgenstein 
received an indirect influence from Peirce both through Ramsey, who read the first edition 
of Peirce's Collected Papers in the 1930s, and also through the works of William James, which 
were read by Wittgenstein with interest. 
29 Thus, what Peirce called the fictive lines up rather neatly with what in more recent 
philosophy has been identified initially by Crispin Wright and named by Mark Johnston 
the response-dependent. It would appear that the considerable work that has been done in this 
area recently is applicable to the question of realism and nominalism as conceived by 
Peirce, and vice versa. 
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that thirteen was not a prime number, in such a possible world thirteen 
would still be a prime number. Numbers are in fact a paradigmatic case 
of entities that have their properties independently of what is believed 
about them. Thus reality need not entail existence. 
One might think that even if reality is not always a guarantee of 
existence, at least the reverse must hold. For if something forms par t of 
the causal fabric (such as a chair or a cat), surely this gives it sufficient 
independence from us that we might be wrong about its characteristics. 
To answer this question requires attending with some delicacy to the 
different ways in which the proper relationship between logic and 
ontology is conceived by Peirce and Armstrong. 
Peirce thought that the recognition of both existence and reality was 
essential to a healthy metaphysics, and that the existent is (logically) 
particular and the real is (logically) general. This is, then, an analogue of 
Armstrong's claim that one needs particulars and Universals to do full 
justice to being. The two claims are different, though, in that Armstrong 
treats particulars and Universals  as different types of thing, like the 
difference between cats and dogs on a very much more general level. 
Peirce however, treats them as different modes o f being. This means that 
rather than speaking of particulars and Universals as themselves entities , 
one may speak of particularity and generality as something all entities 
partake of." 
Consider a cat (Dave). If Dave is deeply affectionate while prone to 
fits of neurotic miaowing, he will share characteristic behaviours to some 
degree with all other affectionate and/or neurotic creatures. Dave will 
thus possess real generality. But Dave is also a unique animal with a 
unique spatiotemporal trajectory, personality and a set of possible 
responses to situations not exhausted by a general description of any 
degree of detail. A degree of particularity is therefore also inherent in 
Dave. 
Predication and the Problem of Universals 133 
30 That is, all worldly entities, Pace the notorious conceptually distilled res posited by many 
metaphysicians. 
B o t h  A r m s t r o n g  a n d  P e i r c e  m a k e  a  s e p a r a t i o n  b e t w e e n  
'logical'/`semantic' and ontological questions, and it might be asked how 
their views differ in this respect. However, Armstrong sees 'semantic' 
questions as concerning the extensions of predicates, and 'ontological' 
questions as concerning the existence of entities. Therefore the answer to 
the problem of universals for him lies within ontology, insofar as the 
problem concerns whether Universals are included amongst the things 
that exist. For Peirce, however, the business of 'logic' in this context is to 
ask what are the fundamental modes of being. The problem of universals then 
receives its answer for Peirce within logic, insofar as real generality is 
affirmed by him as a mode of being alongside existent particularity. The 
Peircean ontologist then inquires into existence and reality (which are 
equal ly concre te —as no ted in sec t ion 1 .1 ,  the abst rac t /concre te  
distinction is orthogonal to the distinction at hand). Thus, it is not that 
according to Peirce the postulation of real generality has nothing to do 
with ontology. It is just that embracing real generality provides no 
one-to-one mapping from real generals onto existent entities, as 
Armstrong imagines there to be. For, as we have already noted, it is 
precisely the characteristic of the real that no collection of existent 
things, no matter how numerous, can exhaust it. 
Thus, the full answer to the question posed earlier of whether things 
which are existent must also be real is that it is a 'category error'. In 
order to be existent a thing must have real properties – in fact it will 
probably have a great many. But qua existent the thing is neither real nor 
unreal, any more than qua coloured object a thing can be square or not 
square. This notion of different modes of being is at first glance a good 
deal more cumbersome than Armstrong's  streamlined approach to 
being, but it has theoretical virtues. For instance, giving up Armstrong's 
notion that committing to both particularity and Universality means 
committing to the claim that particulars and Universals exist as entities 
in  the i r  o wn r ight  s ides teps  the  p rob lem faced  b y Armstron g o f  
explaining how such different types of entity might be related, related so 
intimately in fact that one is never present without the other. As he holds 
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to Flume's 'no necessary connections between distinct existences', and it 
appears to be a necessary truth that particulars and Universals always 
appear together, he is forced to posit that they are internally related. 
Armstrong has admitted that he has not been able to shed any light o n 
this mystery at the heart of his ontology, and his call in 1978 for work to 
be done on an 'empiricist' account of the relation in retrospect seems 
best described as hopeful. 
2.5. Generals and Prediction 
Realism about generals is defined by Peirce as follows: 
The question ... is whether man, horse, and other names of natural 
classes, correspond with anything which all men, or all horses, really 
have in common, independent of our thoughts,  or whether these 
classes are constituted simply by a likeness in the way in which our 
minds are affected by individual objects which have in themselves no 
resemblance... (8.12). 
Peirce thought we needed to postulate such a scholastic realism because 
only this hypothesis could explain the practice of scientific experimentation. 
When scientists perform an experiment in order to test a new hypothesis, a  
key fea ture  o f  the  exp er iment  i s  pr ed i c t i on ,  o f  the  hypothes is '  
consequences, in a manner that is as precise, hypothesis -specific and 
readily experienced as possible, and then careful observation of how the 
world does in fact behave. 
Peirce notes that we often fail to appreciate what a profound capacity 
we possess for predicting the behaviour of our surroundings. In a public 
lecture he gave at Harvard in 1903 he held a stone in the air in front of 
his audience, and challenged them to admit that they knew that the 
stone would fall when he dropped it rather than flying up  in the air. He 
then pointed out that the behaviour of the stone was not subject to any 
influence from what its observers thought might happen to it, and so, 'It 
would be quite absurd to say that ... I can so peer into the future merely 
on the strength of any acquaintance with any pure fiction' (5.94). He 
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concluded that his audience possessed knowledge of an 'active general 
principle', exerting influence on dropped objects, and that this active 
general principle answered his definition of the real. 
This is the way, then, in which scholastic realism explains scientific 
practice, for without it we can make no distinction between what we think 
the extension of a predicate ought to be and what that extension really is 
(that is, between objective and subjective generality). And without that, 
we can engage in conceptual analysis but not in scientific work.' 
As we have seen, Armstrong also argues that Universals are needed to 
explain the regularities postulated by scientists (by 'truth-making' them): 
There had better be some ontological way that respectable predicates, 
ones that yield real regularities, earn their respectability.' 
However Armstrong does not explore the logic of prediction as the 
specific reason why the postulation of his Universals cannot be avoided. I 
sha ll  no w argue tha t  such an omiss ion renders one  vulnerable to  
compromising one's realism. 
2.6. 'Universals' vs. 'Tropes' 
Consider  the predicate ' is  a  cat '  (which is  not  widely regarded as 
'respectable', but which I believe to be so). In order for 'is a cat' to earn 
its respectability, according to Armstrong, we must postulate something 
'ontological'. Why must we postulate a Universal rather than an infinitely 
long set of distinct property instances? Instead of a single 'One Over 
Many' cathood, why not as many individual cathoods as there are cats? 
Such a view does exist of course: trope theory. Trope theory holds that 
properties and relations have their being as particular 'instantiations', 
which are distinct existences, though they may share the 'property' of 
31 This is a point which Scotus appreciated: 'The universals are not fictions of the intellect, 
as in such a case they could not predicate anything about an external object ... nor wou ld 
there be any difference between metaphysics and logic, but indeed every science would be 
logic dealing with the universal'. Cited in Fred Michael, 'Two Forms of Scholastic Realism 
in Peirce's Philosophy', Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, vol. XXIV (1988), 323. 
32 Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, p. 220. 
136 Catherine Legg 
resemblance. As Armstrong has set up the debate between realism and 
Nominalism, he has no real answer to the question why we should prefer 
his ontology of Universals to trope theory." 
On Peirce's approach, however, this question can be answered. The 
answer is that a 'real general' is projectible by us, and thus testable in 
scientific experiment, and an infinitely long set of distinct property 
instances is not. For there is no a priori reason why a set containing 1000 
cat-instances should not contain a pig-instance for its 1001st member. 
But there is an a priori reason why the Universal 'is a cat' should not 
embrace Babe. One doesn't understand cathood if one thinks that the 
same particular can be both a cat and a pig. Thus, only a belief in 
Universals can make sense of our  abil i ty to  extend predicates to 
situations of which we have no direct experience, which just is scientific 
prediction. 
At this point, many trope theorists will protest that the 1000 
cat-ins tances  do in fac t  share something which provides an a 
prior i  justification for including the cat and not the pig among their 
number –and that is the 'property' of resemblance. however, I shall 
assume that insofar as this property of resemblance amongst the 1000 
cats provides projectibility (of the 1000 cats' cathood to further cats) the 
trope theorist does  no thing but  smuggle  rea l  genera l i ty in  the  back 
door ,  thus  reestablishing full-blooded realism. If on the other hand the 
property of resemblance does not provide projectibility then it will not 
provide the a priori justification (for excluding the pig from the cat 
collection) which it is alleged to. 
I t  might  be  ob jec ted  tha t  what  has  been  of fered  i s  a  te r r ib ly  
anthropomorphic reason to postulate one ontological entity (a Universal) 
rather than another (a set of distinct property instances). Just because 
33 He has come some way towards acknowledging this in his latest book, where he writes, ' ... 
the view that properties and relations exist yet are particulars, is an important alternative 
which in many ways respects the spirit of the present enterprise'.  Armstrong, A World of 
States ofAffairs, 22. 
34 A pig from the film of the same name. 
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something is easier for us to grasp and extrapolate, does that mean that it 
is 'out there'? Wasn't this meant to be realism? This objection, however, 
assumes that if we make ontological commitments based on what we find 
easy to  d i scover  o r  t o  b e l i eve ,  we  r i sk  un wi t t ing  er ror  th ro ugh  
substituting the subjective for the objective, or as Peirce would put it, the 
fictive for the real. The objection may be answered by noting that the 
Peircean epistemology provides other means for removing the human 
idiosyncracies and projections from our beliefs than a dist inction 
between what is in the world and what is in the mind. 
Peirce's pragmatic theory of meaning dismisses as meaningless any 
discussion by us of 'things in themselves'," ruling that all we have to work 
with epistemically is our beliefs. He therefore draws his real -fictive 
dist inction within the realm of general  ideas.  He then arg ues that  
through continual  test ing of our  ideas  aga inst  the wor ld through 
prediction and observation, by intelligently identifying and discarding 
those ideas which lead to false predictions, and trying out new ideas, we 
can slowly converge on the real. Thus for Peirce that the real is 
'mind-independent' does not mean that it is 'not in anybody's mind'.  
(Such a definition of the real would be somewhat self-defeating after all.) 
It just means that its character is not altered by any person or group of persons 
having it in their mind. 
Thus, though Armstrong argues for Universals as truth -makers for 
true scientific statements,  he does not seek specifically to explain 
scientific prediction, nor note the fact that we can only make predictions 
by postulating a coherent and graspable idea rather than an infinitely 
long set of distinct things. This is just to say that in concentrating on the 
ontological, truth-making, role which Universals play, he loses sight of 
their logical role as real generals. Therefore, on his construal of the 
problem of Universals, Armstrong cannot make a case for his Universals 
over tropes. 
35 For one example among many see Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, 251-268, 
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2.7. The Real as Representational 
From his use of prediction to identify real generality Peirce draws the 
challenging conclusion that the real is of the nature of a representation: 
When I say that the general proposition as to what will happen, 
whenever a certain condition may be fulfilled, is of the nature of a 
representation, I mean that it refers to experiences in futuro, which I do 
not know are all of them experienced and never can know have been 
all experienced (5.97). 
Peirce  expresses  this ' r epresentat iona l '  nature of  rea l  general i ty  
mathematically, as follows. The medievals defined the general as that 
which is 'predicable of many'. Peirce, however, notes that in this context, 
`many is not enough': 
None of the scholastic logics fails to explain that sol is a general term; 
because although there happens to be but one sun yet the term sol 
aptunt natum est dici de multis. But that is most inadequately expressed. If 
sol is apt to be predicated of many, it is apt to be predicated of any 
multitude however great ... In short, the idea of a general involves the 
idea of possible variations which no multitude of existent things could 
exhaust (5.103). 
This is in fact a quantitative means of expressing the point about the 
superiority of scholast ic  realism to trope theory.  The claim is that  
something is required of a different logical order than a mere set of distinct 
instances of a given property (even if that set is infinitely large), in order 
to  ground predict ion.  In other  words,  general i ty is  i r reducible to 
particularity of whatever cardinality. 
The idea that the real is representational in the sense just outlined is 
challenging because it is a form of idealism, and idealism has been seen 
as antithetical to realism. The conflation of idealism with antirealism was a 
defining moment in analytical philosophy.' Yet the move derives what 
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36 Peter Hylton tells this story well. See Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic 
Philosophy, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 109-110. 
plausibility it has from the collapsing of the real onto the existent. For it is 
only if one believes that reality is restricted to existent things (and 
moreover, only if one assumes a materialist analysis of existence) that 
one will believe that ideas are disqualified from real status by their very 
nature as ideas. Thus, Peirce calls himself an Objective Idealist, and this is 
not a contradiction in terms. 
2.8. The Experimentalist's View of Assertion' (Pragmatism and 
Predication) 
The preceding sections argued for the importance of our practice of 
prediction in grounding our belief in real generality, and pointed out the 
way in which we use prediction together with a belief in real generality to 
winnow error from our ideas, which we express through predicates. Such a 
'predictive approach to predication',  is Peircean pragmatism in a 
nutshell, (which Peirce captured nicely at one point in the phrase, 'The 
Experimentalist's View of Assertion'). 
We have seen that Devitt and Armstrong argued about the semantics 
of general statements antecedently assumed to be true. The way Peirce 
sets up the problem acknowledges that nominalism and realism both 
ascribe extensions to predicates and properties to things. So this is not a 
good place to drive an analytical wedge between the two positions. 
Rather, given that what distinguishes the two is the mind-independence of 
the universal or general,  the crucial testing -ground for nominalism 
against realism is precisely where we project our ideas about the world 
onto a new situation where they may or may not hold water. For error 
(manifested as unsuccessful prediction) is our only experiential link with 
mind-independence. Peirce's pragmatic argument for real ism from 
scientific experiment is that if we are faced with a situation containing 
things over which we have no control, and we find ourselves willing to 
extend general ideas into that new situation, to dismiss alternative 
possibilities that are entirely intelligible but which we know will not 
obtain, that shows that we ascribe reality to those ideas whether we admit it 
or not. 
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One can treat the predicate 'is a cat' as picking out a real property 
without being committed to the existence of cathood. One means by this 
just that the general idea of 'cat' possesses predictive power, so that we 
can extend at least some of the discoveries we make about cats of our 
acquaintance (such as their love of meat and their unwillingness to have 
their tails pulled) to cats with which we are not acquainted. In other 
words, the question is whether 'is a cat' is a properly scientific predicate. 
(This for Peirce, unlike Armstrong, can be a matter of degree.) 
It was noted that the debate between Armstrong and Devitt was sterile 
because the extensions of predicates such as 'is a cat' were taken for 
granted by Armstrong and Devitt while they argued about whether 
existent objects (`cathoods') underpinned that predication in a 
truth-making capacity. We saw that Armstrong explicitly acknowledges that 
the issue has nothing to do with the extensions we ascribe to our 
predicates when he  takes  such pa ins  to  separa te  'semant ic '  
ques t io ns  fro m `ontological' ones." This in fact jars with 
Armstrong's strongly held naturalism and empiricism. If the presence 
of Universals makes no difference to which predicates are applied where, 
how are we to observe Universals at work in the world through scientific 
inquiry? 
By cont rast  the problem of rea l i sm and nominali sm as Peirce  
conceives it arises precisely in situations where a decision needs to be 
made about  whether  to  extend a given general  predicate to  a new 
particular or set of particulars. In such cases we need to decide whether 
past evidence for it was subjective or merely coincidental, or whether the 
idea concerned may be relied upon in a new situation.  That is precisely 
the pragmatic difference between realism and nominalism. Far from a 
dry scholastic argumentative diversion, this is a philosophical choice with 
profound consequences, for future choices not just in scientific contexts, 
but in many other areas of inquiry." 
37 See also Devitt's audacious, 'The strictly semantic problem of multiplicity does not have 
anything to do with Universals' (Devitt, 436). 
38 Moreover, there is probably no area of human life which is not touched by questions of 
realism so construed. Consider, for example, the problem, 'Is my love for him real?' 
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Thus, the separation of semantic from ontological questions need not 
be a precondition of realism, as Armstrong takes i t to be. The question is 
rather: which semantics is objective and which subjective? Which real and 
which only as we think it is? Thus the way is cleared for a realism about 
meanings, which is largely unexplored in the contemporary philosophical 
context." 
3. Conclusion: 'Semantic Realism' 
I f  ca ts  have  so mething in  co mmo n which i s  no t  shared  b y o ther  
creatures, what is that 'something'? The argument of this paper has been 
that the something is not a something that exists ., but something real, and 
by this is meant just that it is projectible into new situations in ways that 
give us a measure of predictive power. 
Thus Armstrong, despite his somewhat renegade status on the current 
philosophical landscape as an extreme and scholastic Realist, is not 
Realist enough. For he is Realist about 'concrete' things (which he calls 
'ontology') and not about meanings (in his terms, 'semantics'). To this 
end, • he turns his Universals into concrete, casually efficacious existent 
things. Thus, the question arises what makes his Universals 'Universals', 
and not just exceptionally large particulars with exceptionally scattered 
(and unusually homogeneous) parts. Realism about meanings is largely 
untouched since Early Modern philosophy hit its stride. Yet ironically, 
according to Peirce, such semantic realism is the logical lesson implicit in 
the Scientific Revolution's greatest discovery of all—the experimental 
method. 
Thus the Problem of Universals is not an exercise in pure ontology, as 
Armstrong and Devitt would have one believe. It is worth exploring the 
considered not as a question of whether some love -ensuring entity(ies) exist, but as a 
question of whether the feeling in question is one I can rely on. 
39 A notable exception is the recent, Kripke and Putnain -inspired growth in 'Twin Earth' 
style examples, designed to demonstrate an externalism about meaning which riches on 
rigid designation. Yet such discussions have so far lacked principled answers to questions 
such as when we should rigidly designate, and according to which features of the objects 
designated. 
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hypothesis that there has been confusion in recent analytic philosophy 
generated through substituting ontological for epistemological, logical or 
semantic questions, and that this has been encouraged by a background 
nominalism in the discipline, for the slide from, 'It's real, ' to, 'It 's an 
existent entity', means that any measure of objectivity for a claim seems 
to need to be backed up by the postulation of some existent entities. It is 
tempting to argue that this has resulted in analytic philosophers casting 
vast shadows of repressed logic across the heavens.' 
Peirce warned against the possibility of 'Nominalistic platonism' 100 
years before Armstrong: 
I n d i v i d u a l i s t s  a r e  a p t  t o  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  a l m o s t  i n c r e d i b l e  
misunderstanding that all other men are individualists too—even the 
scholastic realists,  who,  they suppose, thought that 'universals 
exist' (5 .504). 
This paper contends that that claim was remarkably prescient, where 
'prescient' just means able to identify an active general principle, and on 
the basis of that, know something of what is to come.'" 
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40 See for example the discussion by Armstrong of how universals qua concrete building 
block of the Universe may be 'conjunctive' but not 'disjunctive'. (Armstrong, A World of 
States of Affairs, 26ff). If this charge of 'logical reification' is true, it is somewhat ironic given 
the explicit, enthusiastic, revisionary anti-metaphysical aims of early analytic philosophy. 
41 Thanks are also due to Richard Holton, Frank Jackson, David Armstrong, Huw Price, 
Neil McKinnon, Sally Ann Parker-Ryan, Josh Parsons, Daniel Nolan, Mark Colyvan, 
Howard Sankey, Jim Franklin, Gyula Klima and an anonymous referee for help and advice. I 
have also benefitted greatly from discussions on the email lis t 'Peirce-L', particularly with 
(the late and sadly missed) Tom Anderson and Thomas Riese. 
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